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I. INTRODUCTION 
Recently, participants at the 2015 Pacific McGeorge School of Law global 
symposium debated the emergence of an international law of property.1 
Participants were inspired by Professor John G. Sprankling’s seminal work in the 
field, The International Law of Property, which posited that the old view of 
property as generated by and existing purely in municipal law did not reflect the 
growing influence of international law.2 Throughout the day, a new crew of 
International Property Law scholars delved into the depths of a number of themes 
related to the benefits and potential drawbacks of this evolution.3 
Specific to the realm of ocean governance, the promise and perils of 
international property law are not merely theoretical, but are advancing in 
national regulatory bodies and international tribunals as well.4 There is a rich 
history of ocean space regulation under international law. The law has evolved to 
nationalize ocean space in order to facilitate use and conservation. But the former 
has been well advanced, while the latter has lagged far behind. In this article, I 
discuss the evolving governance of oceans with particular emphasis on the 
threats to sustainability, increased industrialization of the oceans, and the 
prospects for reforms that would address declining ecological health. I argue the 
international law of property, as configured in the oceans, could initiate a 
movement away from sectoral and divided ocean regulation toward more 
integrative approaches that manage unique spaces drawing on scientific 
information, public participation, and data sharing. 
The international community is poised to adopt new governance for the High 
Seas—a continuing illustration of the tragedy of the commons. The High Seas, 
and beneath it “the Area,” are not controlled by any particular national 
government, but are ocean resources open to the international community.5 These 
areas not controlled by national governments are not lawless per se, but 
governance has been least effective in these areas beyond national jurisdiction 
(ABNJ).6 An international law of property could support proposed reforms that 
emphasize the shared nature of ocean resources and collaborative conservation 
 
1. Global Symposium Examined an Emerging International Law of Property, University of the Pacific 
McGeorge School of Law (April 16, 2015), http://www.mcgeorge.edu/News/Global_Symposium_Examined_ 
an_Emerging_International_Law_of_Property.htm [hereinafter Global Symposium] (on file with The University 
of the Pacific Law Review). 
2. JOHN G. SPRANKLING, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PROPERTY (2014). 
3. Global Symposium, supra note 1.   
4. Moira L. McConnell, Observations on the Law Applicable on the Continental Shelf and in the 
Exclusive Economic Zone: A Comparative View, in 25 OCEAN YEARBOOK 221 (Aldo Chircop et al. eds., 2011). 
5. Id. at 221 (stating that the High Seas is “the water column areas outside the 200 nautical miles (NM) 
from the proximate coastal state baselines, beyond any potential EEZ”). 
6. Id. at 221–247. McConnell notes the growing interest in developing a legal basis for waters and 
resources in the High Seas. Id. at 221. 
The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 47 
255 
measures tempered by consideration for the needs of current and future 
generations. With a new legal instrument addressing marine biodiversity in 
ABNJ under the International Law of the Sea, the international community could 
draw upon and contribute to the emerging international law of property. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III)7 
provides a comprehensive blueprint for ocean regulation.8 UNCLOS III was 
drafted with the intent to create a legal order for the oceans by addressing all 
issues pertaining to the seas.9 For that reason, UNCLOS III has been called “a 
constitution for the oceans.”10 Nations that are not a party to UNCLOS III are 
bound by most of its provisions through its nature as customary international 
law.11 Nonetheless, UNCLOS III is not perfect, and its gaps and shortcomings 
have come under increasing scrutiny as ocean systems have declined. 
In creating UNCLOS III, nations recognized that the special interconnected 
nature of the oceans required a unified approach to their management.12 Yet at the 
time, sectoral management that addressed each particular activity with a set of 
guidelines was the dominant mode of environmental regulation. Although the 
majority of ocean pollution is from land-based sources, people harm oceans by 
overfishing, through shipping activities, and from resource development.13 These 
issues are inter-related, but the legal regimes that manage each are divided up, 
often addressed by different organizations or agencies.14 UNCLOS III addresses 
 
7. United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, 21 ILM 1261 
[hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
8. DONALD R. ROTHWELL & TIM STEPHENS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 14 (2010). 
9. Id. 
10. Tommy T.B. Koh, U.N. President, A Constitution for the Oceans, Remarks at UNCLOS (Dec. 10, 
1982), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/koh_english.pdf (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review).  
11. JOSEPH J. KALO ET AL., COASTAL AND OCEAN LAW 408–09 (3rd ed. 2007). “The few countries who 
are not party to the LOS Convention are bound to most of the provisions through customary international law or 
other treaties.” Id. On the other hand, those nations who are not a party to the UNCLOS III cannot directly 
impact its development and implementation, potential benefits, or use procedures such as those designed to 
delineate extended continental shelf claims. Id. at 409 (noting that treaty proponents claim national security is 
promoted by participating in the treaty). 
12. The UNCLOS preamble states “conscious that the problems of ocean space are closely interrelated 
and need to be considered as a whole . . . .” UNCLOS, supra note 7. 
13. Infra Part III. 
14. For example, the International Maritime Organization addresses the shipping industry, while the FAO 
addresses fisheries, in addition to various Regional Fisheries Organizations. Within the United States, 
responsibility for various ocean activities is divided into NOAA Fisheries (species including some fish and 
marine mammals), Regional Fisheries Management Agencies (traditional fishing and aquaculture), the Coast 
Guard (security and safety), the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (regulation and oversight of offshore oil 
and gas drilling operations). At the state level the variety of agencies is even more fragmented. 
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ocean governance at the outset by establishing agreed boundaries of national 
jurisdiction and lawmaking and enforcement responsibilities therein.15 Parties 
also agreed to specific dispute mechanism provisions, including the creation of 
two international bodies—the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and 
the International Seabed Authority.16 The ocean governance UNCLOS III 
employs relies on property and sovereign rights.17 
A. Brief Primer on Ocean Jurisdiction 
The Territorial Seas are recognized as the first twelve nautical miles from the 
shore, which is also called the baseline.18 Nations have the greatest rights in this 
area. Foreign flagged ships have the right of innocent passage through territorial 
seas subject to the law of the pertinent nation, UNCLOS III, and the international 
law on passage.19 Nations can also establish a Contiguous Zone of twenty-four 
nautical miles from the baseline, from which they are allowed enforcement rights 
to protect their territorial seas.20 
The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of a nation is recognized as the area 
200 nautical miles from the shore.21 This area is not territorial in the same sense 
as national sovereignty can be fully exercised. Indeed, the exact nature of the 
EEZ is still being explored and illuminated, as UNCLOS III created it without a 
direct analogue. However, according to Article 56 of UNCLOS III, nations have 
sovereign rights to exploit the EEZ.22 As explained by the U.S. governmental 
agency responsible for oceans management, “[t]he U.S. does not exercise 
sovereignty in the contiguous zone or the EEZ. It does have exclusive sovereign 
rights and jurisdiction for exploration and exploitation of natural resources of the 
seabed, subsoil, water column, and air space in the EEZ.”23 Many nations, 
including the U.S., U.K., Portugal, Germany, and Japan have begun extensive 
exploitation of their EEZs. 
 
15. UNCLOS, supra note 7. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. at art. 3. 
19. Id. at §3. 
20. Id. at art. 33. 
21. Id. at art. 56–57. 
22. See BARBARA KWIATKOWSKA, THE 200 MILE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE IN THE NEW LAW OF THE 
SEA (1989); see also Maria Gavouneli, Functional Jurisdiction in the Law of the Sea, in 62 PUBLICATIONS ON 
OCEAN DEVELOPMENT (2007) (both examining the nature of the EEZ comprehensively). 
23. History of the Maritime Zones under International Law, NOAA, http://www.nauticalcharts. 
noaa.gov/staff/law_of_sea.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review). 
The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 47 
257 
The Continental shelf overlaps with the EEZ in that its breadth is measured 
as 200 nautical miles from the baseline.24 Nations have rights to use shelf 
resources while other nations have limited rights in these zones, such as the 
ability to lay submarine cables.25 Again, this represents a balance between 
lawmaking by a sovereign nation and the respect for the needs of non-nationals. 
Outside of these regions, the oceans are “High Seas,” also known as “areas 
beyond national jurisdiction” where all nations are afforded the Freedom of the 
Seas.26 Freedom of the High Seas means that the area is open to all nations.27 The 
High Seas are res communis—an open access system, for purposes such as 
fishing. This has led to significant impairment of resources as minimum 
coordination or management constrains overuse.28 
Underlying the High Seas is the “Area,” the seabed which the International 
Seabed Authority regulates in order to implement the international deep seabed 
mining regime pursuant to section XI of UNCLOS III.29 
B. Dispute Resolution and International Governance 
In addition to the division into zones of jurisdiction, UNCLOS III created a 
set of mechanisms to resolve disputes:30 UNCLOS III created the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and contemplated dispute resolution by 
the International Court of Justice or an arbitral tribunal.31 This again speaks to the 
 
24. UNCLOS, supra note 17, at art. 76 (noting that shelf extends 200 NM from the baselines). 
25. Id. at art. 77 (rights of coastal states) and 79 (submarine cables and pipelines). It is worth noting that 
placement of submarine cables cause seabed disturbances and the environmental impacts particularly on 
sensitive marine habitats should be minimized. 
26. Id. at Part VII. 
27. Id. at art. 87. 
28. The Working Group, Outcome of the Ad Hoc Open-ended Informal Working Group to Study Issues 
Relating to the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity Beyond National Jurisdiction 
(Jan. 20–23, 2015), http://www.un.org/depts/los/biodiversityworkinggroup/documents/ahwg-9_report.pdf (on 
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
29. UNCLOS, supra note 7, at Part XI. 
30. Id. at art. 287. 
31. The history of the ITLOS is explained in Hugo Caminos, The Establishment of Specialized Courts, in 
CURRENT MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA 
33–40 (Myron H. Nordquist & John Norton Moore eds., 2001); Gritakumar E. Chitty, A Brief History of the 
Post Conference Development of the Tribunal as an International Judicial Body, in CURRENT MARINE 
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA 41–51 (Myron H. 
Nordquist & John Norton Moore eds., 2001); Mohamed Mouldi Marsit, The International Tribunal for the Law 
of the Sea and the Difficulties Encountered During the Initial Phase of its Establishment, in CURRENT MARINE 
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA 53–55 (Myron H. 
Nordquist & John Norton Moore eds., 2001); Gudmundur Eiriksson, Comments on the Origins and Purposes of 
ITLOS, in CURRENT MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF 
THE SEA 57–60 (Myron H. Nordquist & John Norton Moore eds., 2001); David H. Anderson, Deliberations, 
Judgments, and Separate Opinions in the Practice of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, in 
CURRENT MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA 
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comprehensive nature of UNCLOS III. A chamber of the tribunal, the Seabed 
Disputes Chamber, deals specifically with boundary disputes between adjacent 
nations and other seabed disputes.32 
The International Seabed Authority (ISA) is an international body created to 
address mining under Part XI.33 The mining regime was the primary reason the 
U.S. refused to join UNCLOS III, including disagreement over the creation of a 
“strong” or comparatively “weak” ISA, and the treatment of the resources of the 
Area as the “common heritage of mankind.”34 Despite changes to address some of 
these concerns and the implementation agreement for deep seabed mining, the 
U.S. has still failed to accede to the treaty.35 
Even though the U.S. has not acceded to UNCLOS III, UNCLOS III is at the 
center of a robust body of international ocean governance. International 
cooperation through implementation of treaty provisions at the state level, 
functioning dispute resolution mechanisms contemplated by the treaty, and 
arbitral decisions that rely on UNCLOS III provisions as guidance illustrate a 
functional international ocean governance regime. Two recent decisions are 
noteworthy for their emphasis on broad responsibilities in ocean space. The 
Seabed Disputes Chamber of ITLOS issued its first Advisory Opinion (AO) 
regarding a matter ISA referred to it regarding liability for states sponsoring 
mining in the Area.36 The AO asserted that all sponsoring states are held to a high 
standard of due diligence.37 The Republic of Nauru initiated the inquiry because it 
was interested in sponsoring a third party with the technical and financial 
capacity to mine.38 The Republic of Nauru noted that if countries like itself were 
held to the financial risks of these projects they would be functionally excluded.39 
The AO asserts that a state has a responsibility to ensure the sponsored 
 
63–73 (Myron H. Nordquist & John Norton Moore eds., 2001) (explaining initial concept, negotiations, and 
post-conference development and challenges faced during its initial phase of establishment). 
32. UNCLOS, supra note 7, at art. 287; see also PUBLICATIONS ON OCEAN DEVELOPMENT, MARITIME 
BOUNDARY DISPUTES, SETTLEMENT PROCESSES, AND THE LAW OF THE SEA (Seoung-Yong Hong & Jon M. Van 
Dyke eds., 2009) (collection of essays on how nations address disputes, pragmatically and legally). 
33. UNCLOS, supra note 7, at Part XI. 
34. Philip A. Burr, The International Seabed Authority, 29 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 271, 274 
(2006). 
35. UNCLOS, supra note 7. 
36. Donald K. Anton et al., Advisory Opinion on Responsibility and Liability for International Seabed 
Mining (ITLOS Case No. 17): International Environmental Law in the Seabed Disputes Chamber (ANU 
College of Law, Working Paper No. 11-06 (March 23, 2011), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=1793216 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing historic nature of 
AO on four different levels); Anna Dolidze, Advisory Opinion on Responsibility and Liability for International 
Seabed Mining (ITLOS Case No. 17) and the Future of NGO Participation in the International Legal Process, 
19 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 379, 380 (2013) (discussing role of NGOs in ITLOS advisory opinion). 
37. Responsibilities and obligations of States with respect to activities in the Area, Case No. 17, Advisory 
Opinion of Feb. 1, 2011, ITLOS Rep. 2011, 34–35. 
38. Id. at 6–8. 
39. Id. at 8. 
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contractor’s compliance to some degree.40 The AO contributes to the 
development of international environmental law by confirming state liability for 
failing to ensure compliance by the sponsored contractor, although falling short 
of a strict liability scheme.41  
Secondly, ITLOS issued an AO in April 2015 relating to illegal, unreported, 
and unregulated fishing (IUU).42 The tribunal emphasized that under the 
convention, nations must have due regard for the rights and duties of other 
nations.43 Paragraph 216 noted the following: 
While the SRFC Member States and other States Parties to the 
Convention have sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and 
manage the living resources in their exclusive economic zones, in 
exercising their rights and performing their duties under the Convention 
in their respective exclusive economic zones, they must have due regard 
to the rights and duties of one another.44 
What are the responsibilities and liabilities of a nation for vessels flagged in 
that state, for IUU occurring in third party EEZ? The AO notes that flag state 
responsibility is that of due diligence: 
The liability of the flag State does not arise from a failure of vessels 
flying its flag to comply with the laws and regulations of the SRFC 
Member States concerning IUU fishing activities in their exclusive 
economic zones, as the violation of such laws and regulations by vessels 
is not per se attributable to the flag State.45 
Flag State liability arises from its failure to comply with its “due diligence” 
obligations concerning IUU fishing activities conducted by vessels flying its flag 
in the exclusive economic zones of the SRFC Member States.46 
C. The Power of Property 
Discussions of property evoke different norms and preconceptions. Because, 
as Professor Sprankling acknowledges, municipal laws have long defined 
property as a matter of sovereignty, property thus arises from different legal 
 
40. Id. at 34–45. 
41. Anton et al., supra note 36, at 5. 
42. Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SFRC v. 
Ger.), Case No. 21, Advisory Opinion of Apr. 2, 2015. 
43. Id. at ¶ 210. 
44. Id. at ¶ 216. 
45. Id. at 61. 
46. Id.  
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histories and cultural backgrounds.47 Panelists during the symposium noted that 
property doctrine and property theory can, at times, be so far apart as to render 
property an unworkable tool.  
First, those wary of property rights fear the Blackstonian view of property 
vesting absolute authority in the person asserting the right. Although this view 
does not hold universal sway in practice, it is nonetheless influential. The desire 
to respect property rights often obstructs public efforts to change patterns of 
resource use. Property is conceptualized as a bundle of rights consisting of the 
right to exclude, right to use, right to transfer, and even the right to destroy.48 The 
responsibilities side of property has not taken hold in the same ways as the rights 
side. For example, as nations expanded their territorial claims in the oceans, 
management regimes that exploit resources without concomitant resource 
conservation measures have been commonplace. As scholars have noted: 
Many coastal nations have adopted domestic laws that assert expanded 
rights and jurisdiction in their offshore seas. Only rarely, however, do 
these domestic laws expressly recognize the duties, such as the duties to 
conserve and optimally utilize living resources, that current international 
law supposedly imposes on them.49  
For this reason, as I will return to later in this essay, scholars have 
emphasized the need to address the fiduciary responsibilities of nations that 
regulate authority over ocean space.50 As one foundational property case in the 
U.S. emphasized, “[p]roperty rights serve human values. They are recognized to 
that end, and are limited by it.”51 This illustrates the reality that property rights 
are inherently shaped by a corresponding need to accommodate the rights of 
others. Ocean governance provides a useful example proving this point. 
D. Ocean Governance Support for an International Property Law Thesis 
The UNCLOS III territorial regime supports Professor Sprankling’s assertion 
that an International Law of Property has emerged.52 Nations have agreed to 
divide ocean space for the purpose of exploitation as well as conservation. This is 
the purpose of property as a tool—to allocate scarce resources and to facilitate 
the orderly use of resources by identifying clearly the actors who hold rights of 
 
47. SPRANKLING, supra note 2. 
48. JOHN G. SPRANKLING & RAYMOND R. COLETTA, PROPERTY: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 25–93 
(2d ed. 2012).  
49. KALO ET AL., supra note 11, at 408.  
50. See infra Part V.A.   
51. State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372 (Sup. Ct. N.J. 1971). 
52. SPRANKLING, supra note 2.  
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use—and thus must be involved in transactions relating to physically existing 
assets of the marine environment. Moreover, creation of the ISA—an 
international body with supranational authority that vests title to minerals in 
contracting parties sponsored by individual nations—strongly supports the thesis 
of an existing international law of property.53 In the case of seabed minerals, 
property rights are created without reference to a body of national law or national 
sovereignty over the space. The Area is international, it is shared, and its 
resources are the “common heritage of mankind.”54 This strong reference point 
proves Professor Sprankling’s thesis regarding the development of an 
international property law. The recent AO of ITLOS again emphasizes the 
concept that even when exercising their rights, nations must exercise due regard 
for the rights of others.55 
It is important to note however, that the division into boundaries by reference 
to nautical miles does not take into account environmental assets, nor does 
division of the water column and seabed into separate management regimes 
support comprehensive environmental management.56 These are a handful of the 
shortcomings of UNCLOS III. Compounding the problem is the slow progress of 
national implementation of responsibilities to conserve marine resources in 
UNCLOS III and other treaties. The next sections of this essay provides an 
examination of the current state of ocean health and ocean governance to support 
the argument that the international community should act in concert to mend 
existing agreements to strengthen environmental protection in the oceans. 
III. STATE OF OCEAN HEALTH 
The health of ocean systems is declining. This section describes some of the 
most pressing environmental issues in the ocean environment and the most direct 
international environmental laws that address these challenges. First, the section 
discusses overfishing, climate change, and pollution. Next, this section discusses 
emerging environmental impacts from industrialization and place-based 
activities—aquaculture, oil and gas exploration, mining, and ocean renewable 
energy—whose environmental regulation is just emerging. The most at-risk 
region due to lack of governance is the High Seas, where important fisheries and 
marine species spend time or migrate though areas that lack protection of 
national laws. Technology improvements have also allowed oil, gas, and 
minerals exploration and extraction in deep waters where scant research and 
 
53. The Mining Code, INT’L SEABED AUTH., http://www.isa.org.jm/mining-code/Regulations (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
54. Supra text accompanying notes 26–29.  
55. Supra text accompanying notes 40–44. 
56. Robin Warner, PROTECTING THE OCEANS BEYOND NATIONAL JURISDICTION: STRENGTHENING THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORK 64 (2009).  
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scientific data on the environment is available to use in assessing and crafting 
sustainable development frameworks. Even in the unforgiving Arctic 
environment, oil and gas companies are jostling to explore untapped fossil fuel 
resources. 
A. Overfishing 
For the past several decades, commercial fishing has led to severe declines.57 
With the advent of technology such as radar, there was literally nowhere for fish 
to hide from commercial fishery operations.58 Industrial operations that process 
fish at sea to serve markets quickly also accelerated the decline.59 Nearly eighty 
percent of commercial fisheries are overfished.60 The continued extraction of fish 
at unsustainable levels has created a cascade effect that impacts fish, habitat, and 
other marine animals.61 When a popular fish disappears from the oceans, 
fishermen begin to harvest less popular varieties.62 As commercial fishermen 
“fish down the food chain,” even previously unimpaired fisheries have begun to 
exhibit declines from industrialized fishing operations.63 Bycatch of non-target 
species is also common.64 A related synergistic impact is the relationship of fewer 
fish within the environment and the negative consequences to the inter-related 
ecosystem.65 
UNCLOS III endorsed nationalizing EEZs and placing responsibilities for 
fishery conservation in the ambit of state control, which might be assumed to 
result in more effective conservation of fisheries. Instead, many nations restricted 
fishing by foreign fleets, but allowed nationals to overfish and continue the use of 
destructive fishing practices such as trawling. The parties revisited this issue in 
1995 with the U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement.66 This agreement seeks to conserve 
highly migratory fish and stocks that straddle the boundaries of one or more 
EEZs and the High Seas. Nations have also entered into regional fishing 
 
57. Mercedez Lee & Carl Safina, The Effects of Overfishing on Marine Biodiversity, 13 J.  MARINE EDUC. 
5, 5–9, (1995). 
58. Id. 
59. Id.  
60. Id.  
61. Id.  
62. Id.  
63. Id.  
64. Id. Bycatch means discarded fish or other marine resources, and includes marine deaths “due to a 
direct encounter with fishing gear.” What is Bycatch?, NOAA FISHERIES, http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/by_catch/ 
bycatch_whatis.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). Bycatch 
can have severe negative effects on the ocean ecosystem. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. U.N. Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 
164/37 (Aug. 4, 1995). 
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agreements. Although parties need to implement these measures and focus on 
more effective enforcement, the law is in place to address fishing with an 
approach that recognizes collaborative efforts must be used to address the 
interests of multiple nations. 
B. Climate Change 
Climate change or climate disruption is a mounting challenge for ocean 
management.67 The emission of greenhouse gases to the atmosphere has caused 
disruption to previously experienced predictable weather patterns. This has 
caused higher temperatures and melting ice in polar regions among other 
impacts.68 As seas expand, we will see the impact on coastlines with sea level 
rise.69 The addition of carbon dioxide, one of the greenhouse gases, reduces pH 
levels in oceans and causes an effect known as ocean acidification.70 This change 
in pH bleaches corals and impacts the ability of calcium carbonate to form, which 
is needed by many base-level creatures that compose the bottom in the pyramid 
of food resources.71 For this reason, coral reef habitats, and thus the life 
depending on the reefs, are severely impacted.72 
Further, the U.S. government has emphasized that these changes could put 
the entire ocean food web at risk. Ocean acidification can impact the behavior of 
fish, perhaps increasing predation.73 Marine mammals have been impacted as 
warmer waters change patterns of predation.74 For example, waters off the shore 
of California have been warmer in the past year, and thus some fish have stayed 
 
67. RANDALL ABATE & ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON OCEAN AND COASTAL 
LAW: U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 2 (2015).  
68. THOMAS F. STOCKER ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE 2013, THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS: WORKING 
GROUP 1 CONTRIBUTION TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE, V (2013); POTSDAM INST. FOR CLIMATE IMPACT RES. AND CLIMATE ANALYTICS, TURN 
DOWN THE HEAT: CLIMATE EXTREMES, REGIONAL IMPACTS AND THE CASE FOR RESILIENCE, XVII (2013) 
[hereinafter TURN DOWN THE HEAT]. 
69. See TURN DOWN THE HEAT, supra note 68, at 14–16 (discussing sea level rise). 
70. What is Ocean Acidification?, NOAA, http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/acidification.html (last 
visited Jan. 29, 2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
71. Id.  
72.  TURN DOWN THE HEAT, supra note 68, at 90 (noting vulnerable populations that depend on fisheries 
that will be impacted by destruction of coral reef habitats).  
73. “Decreases in carbonate ions can make building and maintaining shells and other calcium carbonate 
structures difficult for calcifying organisms such as oysters, clams, sea urchins, shallow water corals, deep sea 
corals, and calcareous plankton. These changes in ocean chemistry can affect the behavior of non-calcifying 
organisms as well. Certain fish’s ability to detect predators is decreased in more acidic waters. When these 
organisms are at risk, the entire food web may also be at risk.” Id. 
74. Record Number of Stranded Sea Lion Pups Strains California Resources, NPR (Mar. 20, 2015) 
http://www.npr.org/2015/03/20/394242378/record-number-of-starved-sea-lion-pups-straining-calif-resources 
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
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further offshore.75 NOAA scientists and others studying the record number of 
stranded sea lion pups have come to the consensus that mothers have had to 
travel further to get fish for their pups.76 Pups have been found starving and 
emaciated, with some trying to hunt on their own.77 These can be seen as cascade 
effects of climate change and overfishing throughout the interrelated marine 
ecosystem. Fewer fish that are located further offshore impacts reproduction of 
mammals that need land-based rearing grounds.78 
The legal regime to address climate change is scattered.79 To date, nations 
have not fully employed international frameworks to curtail the emissions that 
cause climate change. Although the U.S. and many other nations joined the U.N. 
Framework on Climate Change, progress to implement effective greenhouse gas 
controls has been elusive.80 Many see the Paris climate negotiations as the last 
possible opportunity for the international community to achieve a two-degree 
warming scenario, which the IPCC promoted as the outer-limit of warming to 
avoid catastrophic consequences.81 
C. Pollution 
1. Traditional Pollution 
Traditional chemical pollution from vessel discharges and other industrial 
activities continues to impair ocean waters. The International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) and the London Dumping 
Convention are international treaties that regulate these types of pollution.82 





78. Id. (mentioning that many of the sea lions off of California’s coast are born on Southern California’s 
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79. RICHARD G. HIDRETH, ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE LAW MITIGATION AND ADAPTATION, VI (2009) 
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80. Status of Ratification of the Convention, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
available at http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/status_of_ratification/items/2631.php (on file 
with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
81. Paris Climate Change Conference–November 2015, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, available at http://unfccc.int/meetings/paris_nov_2015/meeting/8926.php (on file with The University 
of the Pacific Law Review). 
82. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution By Dumping Of Wastes And Other Materials, Dec. 
29, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 2403, 1046 U.N.T.S 120 [hereinafter London Dumping Convention]; Protocol of 1978 
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regulations preventing, reducing, and controlling pollution from dumping and 
from vessels.83 
MARPOL addresses pollution from vessel incidents at sea and restricts ships 
from emptying waste into the oceans.84 However, this has not prevented a 
significant amount of waste and oily barge water from entering the oceans and 
has led commentators to note that MARPOL regulation is too lenient. The 
International Maritime Organization is the competent organization that addresses 
shipping issues, including employment, liability for safety, and seaworthiness of 
vessels.85 The London Dumping Convention prohibits the placement of matter in 
the oceans86 to prevent the ocean from becoming a convenient dumping ground.87 
2. Special Growing Plastic Pollution Problem 
The foregoing laws are insufficient to stem the tide of waste entering our 
oceans. A growing accumulation of plastic garbage in the oceans is now 
engaging scientists and policymakers. An area twice the size of the state of Texas 
swirls with murky refuse.88 This is known as the garbage patch or “vortex” 
Pacific gyre. Here, small pieces of plastic accumulate based on movement of sea 
conditions.89 Incredibly troubling is how marine life mistakes the colorful 
garbage for food. An accumulation of garbage in creatures’ stomachs can starve 
marine life. Furthermore, the plastic garbage is leaching chemicals into the water 
and into sea creatures that consume it. 
D. Industrialization 
A picture of the pressures facing oceans wouldn’t be complete without 
highlighting the continued development of ocean resources. First, there is new 
interest in marine renewable energy sources—using devices to capture energy 
from offshore wind, wave and tidal energy, and ocean thermal energy conversion 
(OTEC).90 Second, another development is open ocean aquaculture where sea-
farmers would rear fish for consumption in large pens offshore.91 Third, 
 
83. UNCLOS, supra note 7, at art. 210 (pollution from dumping) and art. 211 (pollution from vessels). 
84. MARPOL, supra note 82. 
85. Introduction to IMO, International Maritime Organization, http://www.imo.org/en/About/Pages/ 
Default.aspx (last visited Feb. 16, 2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
86. London Dumping Convention, supra note 82.  
87. Id.  
88. How Big is the “Great Pacific Garbage Patch?” Science v. Myth, NOAA OFF. OF RESPONSE AND 
RESTORATION (Feb. 7, 2013), http://response.restoration.noaa.gov/about/media/how-big-great-pacific-garbage-
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90. Infra Part III.2.D.1. 
91. Infra Part III.2.D.2. 
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continued interest in offshore oil drilling, with the additional pressure to extract 
Artic oil and gas, is predicted to constitute some one-fifth of the existing reserves 
on earth.92 Finally, activity in offshore mining is increasing.93 Deep seabed mining 
is actually emerging after long being hypothesized as on the horizon. According 
to one source, ISA has issued twenty-six contracts.94 Unfortunately, laws have not 
kept pace with these developments. 
1. Marine Renewable Energy 
Perhaps at no other time has the pressure to develop new sources of 
renewable energy been greater. Marine renewable energy may have the least 
environmental impacts and will help us transition from carbon-based energy 
sources.95 But since energy demand is onshore, whereas the production will take 
place far offshore, all of these forms of energy generation will require submarine 
cables to bring the generated energy to shore for human use. Thus, the 
destruction of some seabed will occur, as well as disturbances—from 
construction of submarine cable highways—that include noise and physical 
disturbance in the immediate vicinity. 
Some of the other impacts from marine renewable energy are common. Each 
of the forms of renewable energy production offshore will involve physical 
disturbance and noise from construction. Ill-sited devices may cause impacts to 
migratory pathways no matter the form of energy generation as they result in the 
introduction of large objects used in the process of energy generation. The 
artificial reef impact suggests that some devices may aggregate fish that are 
associators. Marine life, such as barnacles, may attach itself to the devices and 
over time, that biomass could impact the integrity of the structure. The offshore 
oil and gas industry have used toxic chemicals like biocides to prevent 
degradation of the integrity of devices. If used with marine renewable devices, 
these toxic chemicals could enter the marine environment and cause harm. 
Wind energy offshore has been developed in a number of nations and 
therefore, research on environmental impacts is more robust.96 Beyond the 
construction impacts, these structures act as artificial reefs and create acoustic 
 
92. Infra Part III.2.D.3. 
93. Infra Part III.2.D.4. 
94. Managing Mining of the Seabed, PHYS.ORG (July 9, 2915), http://phys.org/news/2015-07-deep-
seabed.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
95. Jeff Thayler & Patrick Lyons, The Seas are Changing, It’s Time to Use Ocean-Based Renewable 
Energy, the Public Trust, and a Green Thumb to Protect Our Seas From Climate Change, 19 OCEAN AND 
COASTAL L.J. 241 (2014).  
96. A. BRITO-MELO ET AL., 2008 ANNUAL REPORT:  INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY IMPLEMENTING 
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impacts, and windmills have been scrutinized for their effects on avian wildlife 
as blades impact migrating and marine birds.97 Tidal energy devices are similar to 
windmill turbines, but placed in the water to capture movement during the very 
predictable tides.98 The technology is well-developed and has been proven to 
have minimal impacts on the environment. Yet, the acoustic impacts are also 
noteworthy and of concern for sensitive marine life. 
Wave energy conversion devices and OTEC are less developed technologies. 
Wave energy devices convert energy into electricity through various 
technologies,99 such as fixed buoys attached to the seafloor, wave attenuators that 
are moved by the motion of waves, and overtopping devices that draw water 
down through the devices to move turbines.100 Regardless of their conversion 
mechanism, all types of technologies will generate impacts during the 
construction phase. OTEC is premised on capturing energy created by the 
existence of different water temperatures at varying depths.101 Conversion of 
thermal gradient energy will require structures that are place-based and have 
similar impacts to other marine based renewable energy devices. 
UNCLOS III Article 208 addresses pollution from seabed activities and 
requires nations to adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce, and control 
pollution in their jurisdictions.102 Article 208 cross-references articles 60 and 80, 
which make it clear that generation of energy by, for example, wave and wind 
energy devices attached to the seabed, are contemplated by this provision.103 To 
some, the attempt to adapt the UNCLOS III provisions to the new technologies of 
marine renewables is ill-advised and a new regime to manage expedited marine 
renewables development should be introduced.104 
 
97. Offshore Wind Farms Benefit Sealife, Says Study, EWEA BLOG (Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.ewea. 
org/blog/2012/12/offshore-wind-farms-benefit-sealife-says-study/ (on file with The University of the Pacific 
Law Review). 
98. Tidal Devices, EUR. MARINE ENERGY CTR., http://www.emec.org.uk/marine-energy/tidal-devices/ 
(last visited Jan. 29, 2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
99. Wave Devices, EUR. MARINE ENERGY CTR., http://www.emec.org.uk/marine-energy/wave-devices/ 
(last visited Jan. 29, 2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
100. Id.   
101. Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Basics, OFF. OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY, 
http://energy.gov/eere/energybasics/articles/ocean-thermal-energy-conversion-basics (last visited Jan. 29, 2016) 
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
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opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982.  See UNCLOS supra note 17, at art. 208. 
103. UNCLOS, supra note 17, at art. 208.  
104. Francesca Galea, A Legal Regime for the Exploration and Exploitation of Offshore Renewable 
Energy, 25 OCEAN YEARBOOK 101–129 (2011). 
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2. Aquaculture 
Demand for seafood has increased, while at the same time, many commercial 
fisheries are in declining yield. Aquaculture has been proposed as a means to 
address this shortfall in quantity. Aquaculture is the process of rearing fish in 
large ocean pens.105 Waste can accumulate from the rearing of so many fish in 
one location. Thus, many jurisdictions have strictly regulated aquaculture near-
shore, which has driven some companies to seek locations farther offshore in the 
EEZ. An additional concern is the spread of disease among fish in the confined 
aquaculture system. Whether this practice can be conducted sustainably is the 
subject of dispute. Another aspect is the feeding habits of the fish reared. If the 
fish themselves eat other fish, then the amount of protein needed to support the 
aquaculture activities may be more than the amount of protein yielded. Profit-
making enterprises assert that low-grade and inexpensive sources of protein 
generate high-value sources of protein; however, the inputs must be scrutinized 
in order to support the practice as a means to feed a growing global population, 
not just profit and tonnage of fish outputs. 
3. Offshore Oil and Gas 
Oil and gas development near-shore began over a century ago.106 Over the 
past few decades the industry developed technology to explore for and extract oil 
and gas in increasingly deep waters.107 The Macondo well explosion in the Gulf 
of Mexico forever impacted the history of deep-water drilling and demonstrated 
that the industry had yet to develop adequate response capacity for the scope of 
the disaster that ensued.108 As a result, some commentators assert that an 
international global regime should be adopted to compensate for the insufficiency 
of domestic laws to regulate the offshore industry.109 To date, no such 
international law comprehensively regulates offshore oil and gas operations. 
UNCLOS III Article 208 addresses pollution from seabed activities and requires 
nations to adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce, and control pollution in 
their jurisdictions.110 The Arctic is the newest frontier for fossil fuels exploration, 
 
105. What is Aquaculture?, NOAA FISHERIES, http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/aquaculture/what_is_ 
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although no projects are anticipated in the U.S. territory for the foreseeable 
future. 
4. Deep Seabed Mining 
We have little experience with mining offshore to date, but significant 
momentum to expand mining is gathering.111 One example of offshore mining is 
diamond mining from Namibia. Gravel is also mined in various offshore 
locations. Our lack of information about deep seabed environments compounds 
the issues. The type of deposits a company extracts drives the impacts from 
seabed mining. The ISA has adopted regulations in a “mining code” for 
polymetallic nodules, ferromanganese crusts, and polymetallic sulfides.112 
Polymetallic nodules are potato-shaped rocks found at depths of 9,000 to 
18,000 feet that contain copper, cobalt, manganese, and nickel.113 Polymetallic 
sulfide deposits, formed by deep-water vents contain silver, gold, copper, 
manganese, cobalt, zinc, and lead.114 
In addition to the many contracts the ISA has issued, the company Nautilus 
Minerals Inc. has obtained a concession to mine offshore Papua New Guinea.115 
This project will help to demonstrate the viability of these mining projects. 
In conclusion, significant work is needed to improve the state of ocean 
health. The stressors on ocean health are transboundary.116 Thus, none of the 
stressors can be adequately addressed by one nation alone—a concerted effort of 
the international community will be required. There is some promise in the fact 
that issues involving conservation and the gaps in international regulation have 
reached international tribunals, organizations, and working groups and has 
generally entered into mainstream discussions focused on future solutions. One 
scholar noted “there will be more and more problems and disputes concerning the 
conservation and exploitation of the living resources of the sea and the protection 
of the environment.”117 We must seize these disputes as an opportunity to expand 
protection of environmental resources, moving more in the direction of 
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integrative regulation and away from the responsive, sector-by-sector regulation 
that has thus far failed to protect the oceans from severe harms. 
IV. BROADER ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
As the prior section illustrates, ocean regulation has followed a sectorial 
management approach. Individual activities spurred adoption of laws specific to 
regulating the activity. Beyond these sectoral laws, there are an abundance of 
international environmental laws that influence environmental protection 
offshore. As one expert has explained, however, the regime of environmental 
protection suffers from a lack of implementation of these responsibilities in the 
domestic context and a failure to unify protection of the seabed with the water 
column itself and the living marine resources that depend on a healthy 
environment.118 
First, UNCLOS III contains requirements for protecting the environment in 
Part XII.119 Article 192 establishes a fundamental duty of parties to protect and 
preserve the environment.120 It can be perceived that this duty is elevated above 
the sovereign right of states to exploit their natural resources because Article 193 
provides that the right must be exercised by states “in accordance with their duty 
to protect and preserve the marine environment.”121 Article 194(1) says that states 
shall take, individually or jointly as appropriate, all measures necessary to 
prevent, reduce and, control pollution of the marine environment from any 
source.122 
In their treatise on the International Law of the Sea, authors Donald Rothwell 
and Tim Stephens explain the interplay among various international sources to 
support an environmental ethic of transboundry obligations in the oceans.123 As 
they note, UNCLOS III 194(2) provides that states are to ensure that activities 
under their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to other states or their 
environment. States also must ensure that pollution does not spread beyond the 
areas where they exercise sovereign rights,124 which is built upon the Trail 
Smelter case. In that case, a smelter in British Columbia created pollution that 
drifted into the neighboring U.S. and damaged natural resources and property in 
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the state of Washington. The U.S. and Canada agreed to resolve the dispute and 
submitted itself to the tribunal for a binding resolution.125 The tribunal held that a 
nation cannot knowingly permit use of its territory to cause serious injury by 
pollution in the territory of another state “when the case is of serious 
consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.”126 
Further, the obligation is an incorporation of responsibility referred to in the 1972 
Stockholm Declaration and 1992 Rio Declaration to prevent damage to the 
environment of areas beyond national jurisdiction.127 Most, if not all, international 
environmental lawyers would contend that the 1972 Stockholm Declaration is 
customary international law.128 Moreover, with the addition of the Rio 
Declaration, these declarations form the basis for an ethic of environmental 
protection and are the bedrock to international environmental law. 
Biodiversity, of seas and otherwise, is promoted through the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD).129 This convention promotes the equitable sharing of 
benefits from genetic resources, specifically the growing interest in 
bioprospecting. Indeed, the CBD cites verbatim the 1972 Stockholm 
Declaration.130 As nearly all nations have adopted the CBD—except three, 
including the U.S.—it is important to respect its binding nature on parties and 
likely ascendency to customary international law. 
Additional treaties could be drawn upon to protect marine wildlife. Using 
trade as its means of impact, the Convention on the International Trade in 
Endangered Species protects a number of threatened marine species.131 For 
example, all sea turtles are facing the threat of extinction and thus their harvest 
and trade is prohibited by the Convention on the International Trade in 
Endangered Species.132 The International Convention for the Regulation of 
Whaling has curtailed overharvesting of whales, although some whaling 
continues.133 This Convention has been instrumental in rebuilding whale 
populations. 
At best, these different laws represent a patchwork of protection, which has 
failed to keep pace with the advancing utilization of ocean living and non-living 
resources. In addition to proactive measures, the global community has yet to 
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settle on the means to address damage caused to the global commons or swift 
means to address transboundary harms. As one scholar noted, “principles of 
liability and compensation in cases of transboundary damage are not well 
developed and the State practice and treaty formulations at the global level 
continue to show variation and disparity in content.”134 
V. GROWING SUPPORT FOR INTEGRATIVE SOLUTIONS 
There is growing international interest to address the threats to ocean 
sustainability. The Rio Declaration and Brundtland Report, “Our Common 
Future,” recognized the promise of sustainable development that put 
environmental conservation at the forefront of consideration during 
development.135 Spurred significantly by public interest groups and reaching into 
the commercial interests that wish to continue to profit from abundant ocean 
resources, change is afoot. Robin Warner, in her seminal book on sustainable 
development, tracks how human impacts on the marine environment must be 
curtailed by filling gaps in international law.136 
A. Ocean Public Trust 
Under the concept of the public trust doctrine, the oceans are held in trust as 
assets by governments for current and future generations of citizens.137 It is 
proposed as a limit on resource consumption, overuse, and overexploitation. 
Advocates draw on the public trust concept to limit total industrialization and 
form a foundation for limits on fishing, shipping, and energy development that 
has cumulatively overwhelmed ocean systems’ carrying capacity. Scholars 
acknowledge potential resistance to applying the doctrine. As Stephen Roady 
notes, “it is controversial because it has the potential to pit the public interest in 
access to certain lands and waters against property owners asserting a competing 
interest.”138 
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What is the history of the public trust doctrine? Its origins are in the Roman 
Institutes of Justinian, which likely borrowed the idea from the Greeks.139 The 
concept was then incorporated into England’s common law.140 The U.S. inherited 
the concept from the English crown.141 Each U.S. state has a version applicable to 
submerged and tidelands and often water—even groundwater in California—
which has one of the broadest conceptions of the public trust doctrine of any U.S. 
state. Critics challenge its application to the Federal government in the U.S., but 
a large number of scholars advocate its use in relation to conserving ocean 
resources under federal control.142 
Scholars such as Professor Peter Sand have argued cogently that the public 
trust doctrine should be extended internationally to common pool resources. Sand 
explains that because it has common law history, it has no exact parallel in civil 
law systems, yet he persuasively argues it could be used for the conservation of 
oceans.143 He notes that the EEZ and additional international obligations make 
clear that a nation’s use of the resources is “not proprietary, but fiduciary.”144 
B. Marine Spatial Planning 
As documented in this paper, both traditional and new uses of oceans have 
intensified environmental degradation. As one expert on ocean energy systems 
perceived, “[i]nstead of some usages replacing others, it is likely that traditional 
usages of ocean space [will] continue or even increase, while new and competing 
uses will equally require large areas.”145 It will then be necessary to find means to 
facilitate this development in a way that avoids conflicts among users while also 
preventing decline of marine ecosystems. 
Marine Spatial Planning (MSP) is similar to ocean zoning, but with 
sensitivity to the environment.146 MSP draws on zoning concepts where particular 
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locations are identified for specific uses and potentially impactful uses are 
limited, outlawed, or designated for specific places to reduce harm.147 “[MSP] is a 
public process of analyzing and allocating the spatial and temporal distribution of 
human activities in marine areas to achieve ecological, economic, and social 
objectives that are usually specified through a political process.”148 
MSP is employed in different countries to different degrees—one of the best 
examples is Australia’s Great Barrier Reef.149 The concept is also used to manage 
resources in Belgium and Germany.150 It is used extensively in the U.S. by coastal 
states such as California, Oregon, and Rhode Island. One challenge of MSP in 
international waters is confronting the boundaries of multiple nations, many of 
which do not respect ecological boundaries.151 Indeed, experts have emphasized 
that the success of the Australian Great Barrier Reef is related to the fact that it is 
a large marine ecosystem that is within the national jurisdiction of a single 
nation.152 In the case of the High Seas, the lack of clear authority to designate uses 
or prohibited activities has also been seen as a challenge for which various 
international authorities must be employed to facilitate MSP.153 
An important aspect of this tool is the subcategory of Marine Protected Areas 
that are “no take” zones where restoration of marine living resources can occur.154 
Scholars have suggested closing the High Seas as a means of increasing the 
possible fishing success in nearby areas under national jurisdiction.155 This would 
be of particular importance to migratory fish such as tuna, billfish, and sharks.156 
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The world’s oceans are governed as a system of over 150 sovereign exclusive economic 
zones (EEZs, [approximately forty-two percent] of the ocean) and one large high seas 
(HS) commons ([approximately fifty-eight percent] of ocean) with essentially open 
access. Many high-valued fish species such as tuna, billfish, and shark migrate around 
these large oceanic regions, which as a consequence of competition across EEZs and a 
global race-to-fish on the HS, have been over-exploited and now return far less than their 
economic potential. We address this global challenge by analyzing with a spatial 
bioeconomic model the effects of completely closing the HS to fishing. This policy both 
induces cooperation among countries in the exploitation of migratory stocks and provides 
a refuge sufficiently large to recover and maintain these stocks at levels close to those 
that would maximize fisheries returns. We find that completely closing the HS to fishing 
would simultaneously give rise to large gains in fisheries profit ([more than 100 
percent]), fisheries yields ([more than thirty percent]), and fish stock conservation ([more 
than 150 percent]). We also find that changing EEZ size may benefit some fisheries; 
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C. Environmental Impact Assessment 
The United States adopted the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in 
1970.157 NEPA’s foundational principle is that federal agencies must make an 
assessment of the environmental impacts of their proposed actions.158 Although 
federal law does not require that agencies take the most environmentally benign 
course of action identified during the environmental impact assessment process, 
the process requires an analysis of the alternatives, including a no-action 
alternative, and cumulative impacts. Proposals often benefit by the incorporation 
of mitigation provisions and adjustments to reduce environmental impacts that 
may have evaded identification without the process. 
This concept of environmental assessment has been exported to many nations 
and now exists at the international level as well.159 The Transboundary 
Environmental Impact Assessment (TEIA) was adopted by the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe, known as the ESPOO Convention.160 The 
ESPOO Convention requires that nations that take action that will cause 
transboundary environmental impacts assess those effects and provide 
transparency and an opportunity for comment from citizens of both nations 
impacted.161 In a transboundary context, it is often the host country that will 
receive the benefits of a project, while environmental impacts are often more 
concentrated on the other, non-project nation. Some have noted that the TEIA has 
been widely adopted due to its lack of a hard, outcome-based limitation on 
proposed actions.162 While impacts must be analyzed, and tradeoffs considered, 
no mitigation actions are imposed by virtue of the assessment itself. 
The ESPOO Convention explicitly states it is not to be used to require 
transboundary assessments of marine activities.163 Instead, we can look to the fact 
that the UNCLOS III itself articulated the environmental impact assessment 
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concept in Article 203.164 Today, environmental impact assessment is proposed as 
another way of integrating scientific information into project proposals to reduce 
impacts on the marine environment. Although the process itself does not ensure 
prevention of environmental harm, it does facilitate better decision making by 
making explicit the tradeoffs of development and by requiring transparency, 
which facilitates broad involvement by the public and non-governmental 
organizations that can sometimes advocate strongly for mitigation of harms from 
the proposed development project. Environmental impact assessments can 
require that alternative sites are considered and can impose the responsibility to 
consider the cumulative impacts from a specific project. 
D. The Proposed Implementation Agreement 
Professor Sprankling noted that technological advances allowing for resource 
exploitation called for the international regulation of territories outside any one 
nation.165 This advancement forms one part of the body of the international law of 
property. As the pressures on oceans were mounting, the United Nations 
convened an ad-hoc open-ended informal working group to consider measures to 
address marine biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction.166 The working 
group seeks to press momentum on an agreement to conserve the marine 
biological resources of ABNJ. Among the recommendations is the development 
of an international instrument under UNCLOS for the conservation and 
sustainable use of marine biological diversity in ABNJ.167 As previously 
discussed, parties have created an implementation agreement to address 
overfishing—the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement—and created regional fisheries 
organizations to attempt to prevent overfishing of highly migratory and 
straddling stocks of fish.168 A similar agreement has not been reached to 
implement more broad conservation measures for marine impacts. However, it is 
possible to build on prior success, but garnering the political will to bring into 
existence an agreement limiting impacts on the environment takes time, effort, 
and leadership. 
As the prior sections of this paper explored, there are many stressors on 
marine environments, and the toolbox that has developed to address them is more 
robust now.169 The proposed agreement would be built around the well-
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established practices of marine spatial planning, environmental impact 
assessment, and scientific information sharing.170 As outlined in the draft report of 
the ad-hoc open ended informal working group studying potential conservation 
of areas beyond national jurisdiction, “several delegations . . . expressed the view 
that a global universal governance structure remained the best way to promote 
sustainable marine biodiversity beyond areas of national jurisdiction.”171 On the 
other hand, some delegations emphasized that existing legal instruments, as have 
been discussed in this essay, exist, and focus should be on ensuring those binding 
legal provisions are implemented.172 Further, the tools outlined—MSP, EIA, and 
technology and data sharing—could be employed under the existing legal 
provisions of UNCLOS III, ESPOO, and CBD. However, these international 
agreements do not solve all the gaps, such as marine genetic resources in the 
High Seas. A new agreement could bridge these gaps, although even through the 
use of existing legal provisions it is apparent that international cooperation is 
critical to addressing the transboundary impacts beleaguering the ocean 
environment.173 
The successful implementation of a Marine Protected Area (MPA) network 
through the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the 
North-East Atlantic (OSPAR) illustrates a model that was built upon existing 
legal authorities.174 OSPAR is a regional agreement. Efforts to create an MPA 
were initially led by non-governmental organizations then championed by the 
Netherlands and later Germany.175 
Those concerned about the health of the marine environment need to 
generate the political will to put limits on consumption and destruction. It 
requires that parties acknowledge the interrelated nature of ocean spaces and the 
health of coastal ecosystems. It is ineffective to manage human impacts primarily 
in the coastal zone and territorial seas. To some extent, the introduction of the 
EEZ was a step toward expanding regulation beyond national territories without 
completely closing the oceans to the peaceful uses of other coastal and non-
coastal nations. But, the existing environmental regulations have been 
insufficient from both the perspective of gaps and inability to proactively address 
emerging issues.176 Sectoral regulation also allows for inefficiencies in a context 
where enforcement at the minimum required level has been insufficient. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The international law of property has the potential to improve coordination of 
ocean resource management. The declining status of biodiversity, fisheries, and 
ecological health demands restorative projects and curtailment of pollution and 
over-use. Legal scholars have identified the need for legal research to clarify 
rights in the EEZ and ABNJ, for orderly development of marine renewables, to 
reduce impacts of climate change, and to transition away from a fossil fuel 
dominated economy. Marine biodiversity decline has the most severe impact on 
island nations, whose economies depend on healthy oceans. As the working 
group on conserving marine biodiversity noted, “accumulating and compounding 
human impacts ha[ve] undermined the health of the oceans thereby gravely 
threatening the well-being and livelihood of their populations.”177 As a practical 
matter, nations should engage in the negotiation of a new High Seas Agreement 
promoting the protection of biodiversity. We are perhaps on the cusp of such an 
agreement, but need legal hooks to reel in political support, and the international 
law of property could be one such hook. The grave concerns of overfishing and 
protecting biodiversity animate the discussion about bringing stakeholders 
together to share information and discuss the benefits of ocean resources. The ad 
hoc, open-ended, informal working group studying issues relating to the 
conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity in ABNJ strongly 
recommends the use of new tools to help overcome the challenge of fragmentary 
management deficient in the employ of scientific information. 
While the international community would benefit from an implementation 
agreement that addresses High Seas management pursuant to UNCLOS III, we 
are also in need of a new ethos of shared responsibility. The International Law of 
Property may be influential in guiding that development as well. These are our 
shared resources and our shared responsibilities. Historically, the drafters of 
UNCLOS III recognized that the oceans must be managed with special attention 
to its integrated functioning—the mindset of a supranational public trust imposed 
on all nations could facilitate sustaining our common resources. The public trust 
doctrine has many of the same features espoused by soft law instruments—
including the precautionary principle and intergenerational equity.178 When 
engaging in ocean activities, all nations should take into account not only the 
aspirations of their own citizens, but also responsibilities to other nations and our 
future generations. The “common heritage of mankind” regime adopted for the 
seabed minerals was a strong articulation of our shared destinies.179 Without 
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integrated, science-based ocean management, it will not be possible to achieve 
sustainable development and all nations—whether coastal or not—will be poorer. 
